The Death Sentence for Mahmoud Muhammad Taha:
Misuse of the Sudanese Legal System and Islamic Shari’a law?

CONCLUSION

The case involving Mahmoud Muhammad Taha poses questions such as ‘What form of Islam was President Ja’far Mohammed al-Nimeiri attempting to introduce?’ and ‘What perspective or level of understanding for the message of Islam and the message of the Qur’an did Nimeiri promote?’ As stated above, Taha was given no time at all to repent, as opposed to either three days (or even less), as his co-accused were offered. It seems to be more obvious that the final decision delivered by Nimeiri, for Taha’s execution, was far more the manifestation of the human nature of rivalry, competition and hate. Nimeiri was not punishing a disbeliever, but obliterating someone who was perceived to be a political opponent. This decision had no reflection on support for Islam, in any way.

As it says in the Qur’an, in Surah Al-Nisa 4, verse 137,

Those who believe, then reject Faith, then believe (again) and (again)
reject Faith, and go on increasing in Unbelief – Allah will not forgive
them nor guide them on the way.[lxxvii]

Shaikh Abdur Rahman, the retired Chief of Justice in Shari’a law in Pakistan, argues in no uncertain terms, that

This is a striking pronouncement and almost conclusive against the thesis that an apostate must lose his head immediately after his defection from the faith. The verse visualises repeated apostasies and reversions to the faith, without mention of any punishment for any of these defections on this earth. The act of apostasy must, therefore, be a sin and not a crime. If he had to be killed of his very first defection, he could not possibly have a history of conversions.[lxxviii]

This interpretation has also been upheld by Maulana Abu’l-Wafa Thana’ Ullah from Amritsar, who is a well respected scholar among the ahl-i-Hadith (The People of the Hadith), whose work includes Islam aur Masihiyyat.[lxxix] Muhammad Zafrullah Khan comments on 4:137 by stating that this verse proclaims that every person is given the choice to accept Islam of their own free will and that every possible way of entering the faith is accessible to all. He further comments: ‘It has also been proclaimed that it is possible for everyone to depart from Islam by any of the doors that provide entry into Islam and to proclaim his disbelief and his apostasy. Thus as the doors of entry into the circle of Islam are open to everyone, the doors of egress from Islam are also open.’[lxxx]
For a person to depart from their faith and leave Islam, Khan raises the question of whether the teachings of Islam allow those found guilty to be able to offer any repentance (istitabah) and return to the faith. He argues that this verse (4:137) establishes that if a person has sincerely believed in Islam and then announces that they have left the fold of the faithful, and also admit that they deny God and the Prophet Muhammad, then God still offers them an opportunity to return to hold a legitimate place within the Islamic community – which they undertake sincerely – then there is nothing to prevent this from occurring. The doors of entry into Islam are as equally open to these people, as they were open the first time, when they became a Muslim. If, after this return to Islam, the same person again denies God and the Prophet Muhammad, this is also an acceptable act. The person is free to do so a second time, and is not subject to any restriction, for there is no compulsion; there is freedom of conscience and freedom of belief. If he disbelieves again and goes on advancing in disbelief and does not repent, Allah would not forgive such a one, nor would guide him to any way of deliverance. He would achieve no spiritual success.[lxxxi]

Also commenting on this verse, Syed Barakat Ahmad argues that the death penalty after the first time a person is proven guilty of apostasy cannot be defended, due to the meaning of this Qur’anic verse. He perceives that, clearly, ‘a recanter cannot enjoy the repeated luxury of believing and disbelieving if the recantation is punished by death. A dead man has no further opportunity to “again believe and disbelieve”.’[lxxxii]