The Challenge and Soviet Deception
The course of events throughout the wars fought by the Arabs against Israel has proven that the Soviet Union’s positions in the region were dictated by the requirements of the global strategic conflict between itself and the United States over the division and re-division of spheres of influence around the world. Behind these actions lay the Russians' attempt to disrupt the balance of power as a step toward expanding their influence globally.
According to the analysis presented in this book regarding the dimensions of Soviet strategy in the region, the Soviet Union “encouraged the Arabs, both implicitly and explicitly, to rely on its intervention whenever the West intervened. This was precisely what it aimed for by involving the Arabs through military armament - to make them endure hostility from the West beyond what they could bear. It knew with certainty that the more we escalated our enmity toward the West, the stronger our sense of dependence on the Soviets would become. And when we suffered a military defeat, the Soviet Union did not intervene to assist us.”
“In its stance toward the Arabs,” the book states, “the Soviet Union was setting a trap for the Arabs, ensuring their defeat in every domain so that their losses would drive them to rely on and become subordinate to it.”
This is exactly what the Soviet Union did during the June 1967 war when it pushed Nasser into war by providing him with false information claiming that Israel was amassing troops to invade Syria. However, at the last moment, the Soviets instructed Nasser not to launch the first strike. As a result, Nasser received the first blow from Israel and was abandoned by the Soviets, leading to his defeat. For further details, refer to our book Sadat.
Similarly, during the fifth war in Lebanon, the Soviet Union employed the same tactics. According to issue 126 of Al-Majalla magazine, dated July 10, 1982, the Soviets had: “pledged to support Syria during the weeks leading up to the anticipated Israeli invasion of Lebanon, including sending Soviet military personnel to operate Soviet-made SAM missile batteries within Syria itself.”
“These Soviet promises boosted the confidence of the Syrians, who declared that they would join the fight alongside the Palestinians if Israel invaded southern Lebanon.”
Thus, the Soviet Union prepared the Syrians and Palestinians to believe it would back them. However, when the war actually broke out, Al-Majalla reports that the Soviets “threw their diplomatic weight behind efforts to prevent a full-scale confrontation between Israel, Syria, and Lebanon, fearing that such a war would escalate into a comprehensive conflict that they believed the Syrians would lose. The Soviets concentrated their efforts on brokering a ceasefire to avoid being drawn into fulfilling their commitments to Syria under the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.”
The Soviet betrayal of the Arabs during the recent war in Lebanon became so evident that even their own allies were compelled to criticize them. As reported by Al-Hawadith magazine on July 30, 1982: “Arafat went several times to the Soviet embassy in West Beirut, where he met with Ambassador Alexander Soldatov, but then he stopped visiting the embassy. Eventually, Soldatov came to him offering him the option to leave Beirut aboard a Soviet worship. This prompted Arafat to warn the Soviet ambassador that he might be forced to sever the organization's ties with the Soviet government if he received a similar offer from Moscow.” (End of quote).
Furthermore, the Palestinian leader Nayef Hawatmeh, head of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine - which the Soviets regarded as the equivalent of the communist party within the resistance movement - was also critical of the Soviet Union. In the same issue of Al-Hawadith, it was reported: “Questions continue to be raised about Nayef Hawatmeh’s criticism of both the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front and the Soviet Union regarding the situation in Lebanon. These questions arise because Hawatmeh had previously been one of the strongest supporters of those he now criticizes.”
Al-Hawadith added: “It is also reported that Yasser Arafat is mediating between Saudi Arabia and the Democratic Front, following Hawatmeh’s declaration that he is no longer a Marxist but a socialist.” (End of quote).
Thus, Moscow’s allies found themselves compelled to criticize it, reaching its peak as reported by Al-Hawadith on July 9, 1982, detailing the actions of Libya’s leader, Muammar Gaddafi (Moscow’s man in the region):
“Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was extremely angry with the Soviet Union over its indifferent stance on the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. He summoned the ambassadors of most Eastern Bloc countries to convey his views on the Soviet position.”
The magazine continued: “Libya’s president told them: ‘The friendship between progressive Arab forces and the socialist bloc is in as much danger as the Palestinian resistance itself, and it is on the verge of igniting just as Beirut is about to go up in flames.’ Diplomatic sources reported that the meeting lasted only five minutes, after which the colonel asked the ambassadors to leave immediately!” (End of quote).
The Soviet indifference to the events in Lebanon stood in stark contrast to the active and effective role played by the United States throughout the Lebanese war. When reports emerged that America had resolved to send some of its forces as part of an international contingent to help in the “separation of forces” in Lebanon, Soviet leader Brezhnev reacted furiously, stating: “We object unconditionally to the presence of American forces on Lebanese soil, and we have previously issued a warning in this regard.” Refer to Al-Hawadith, July 30, 1982.
This confirms that the Soviets viewed regional events solely through the lens of their strategic rivalry with the United States. Moreover, their interest in the Lebanese conflict was primarily driven by concerns over the demonstrated ineffectiveness of Soviet weaponry compared to the more advanced American arms, particularly in the field of electronics.
News reports indicated that after their missiles were struck in the Bekaa Valley, the Soviets “shipped several of these damaged units back to their country for intensive examination. They also sent a destroyed T-72 tank from Lebanon to determine why the Israelis had been able to destroy a significant number of these highly advanced tanks.” Refer to Al-Majalla, July 10, 1982.
It seems as though the Soviets were disturbed by the failure of their weapons, which threatened their reputation among their allies. They wanted the Arabs to be defeated, but they did not want the cause of defeat to be the ineffectiveness of their weapons, as this would jeopardize their influence in the region.
What this book asserts - that the Soviet Union was "setting a trap for the Arabs to ensure their defeat in every field, thereby driving them to rely on and become subordinate to it" - has been consistently validated by events in every war fought by the Arabs.
